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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET). 
Let me begin by expressing my admiration for the work per-
formed by Justice Elana Kagan, who now occupies the seat of the 
Supreme Court that became vacant when I retired a few years ago. 
She has written opinion after opinion, both for the Court and the in 
dissent, which expresses my reaction to a particular issue that is far 
more articulate and persuasive than anything that I might have writ-
ten. The fact that she is performing so capably is particularly grati-
fying because it confirms my judgment that my retirement would 
benefit the public as well as myself. Thanks to Elana, I have never 
regretted my decision to retire. But as my former colleague, Bill 
Rehnquist, often said, there are occasions when even “Homer nods.” 
This morning, I plan to say a few words about one of those rare oc-
casions—Chaidez v. United States,1 decided about two years ago. 
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane,2 a per-
son whose criminal conviction became final before the United States 
Supreme Court announced a new rule of constitutional law may not 
rely on that new rule as a basis for attacking his conviction. In 
Chaidez, the Court held that under Teague the petitioner could not 
rely on my opinion for the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky,3 as a basis 
for challenging the validity of her plea of guilty to mail fraud 
charges that subjected her to mandatory removal from the county.4 
In Padilla, the Court had held that the defendant could challenge 
the validity of his conviction because his lawyer gave him incorrect 
advice about the deportation consequences of his plea.5 There was 
nothing new about the basic rule that every defendant has a consti-
tutional right to competent counsel before entering a plea of guilty. 
                                                                                                             
 1 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
 2 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 3 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 4 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105. 
 5 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
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But, according to the majority in Chaidez, our ruling in Padilla was 
novel because we “resolved the threshold question before us by 
breaching the previously chink-free wall between direct and collat-
eral consequences” of criminal convictions.6 This morning I shall 
make four brief comments about that “chink-free wall.” 
First, unlike the Teague rule itself, as well as the constitutional 
law rules to which Teague applies, the distinction between collateral 
and direct consequences is the product of state court decisions, 
lower federal court decisions, and law review articles. There are no 
Supreme Court opinions endorsing the “chink-free wall” between 
collateral and direct consequences. Indeed, the Court’s opinion in 
Chaidez remains agnostic about the wall’s existence and even 
acknowledged that the Court “had never attempted to delineate the 
world of ‘collateral consequences.’”7 
In an attempt to find support for the existence of this chink-free 
wall, the Court’s opinion curiously relies on a law review article en-
titled Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas by Gabriel Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., for the 
proposition that exclusion of advise about collateral consequences 
from the Sixth Amendment’s scope was one of “the most widely 
recognized rules of American law.”8 The Court’s reliance is curious, 
in my view, because the article was critical of that distinction. The 
Court’s citation is even more puzzling because I, too, had relied on 
that article in my opinion for the Court in Padilla, but for a different 
proposition: prevailing professional norms require counsel to advise 
her client regarding the risk of deportation. The article thus illus-
trates how, in the unique context of immigration law, Strickland may 
be applied even if there is a “chink-free wall” between collateral and 
direct consequences. 
Second, instead of “breaching” that wall, Part II of the Court’s 
opinion in Padilla concluded that deportation was “uniquely difficult 
to characterize as either a direct of collateral consequence” and 
therefore the distinction as “ill suited” to evaluating the petitioner’s 
                                                                                                             
 6 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. 
 7 Id. at 1108, n. 5. 
 8 See id. at 1109 (citing to Gabriel Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
697, 706 (2002). 
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claim.9 There is, of course, a clear difference between declining to 
rely on a distinction and concluding that it must be changed. The 
Court in Chaidez faults the Padilla opinion for fully explaining why 
lower court doctrine was inapplicable instead of ignoring that prec-
edent and simply discussing the Strickland standard. 
Third, whether a particular consequence of a criminal conviction 
is appropriately characterized as “direct” or “collateral” is far less 
important than evaluating its impact on a particular individual. The 
use of such a glittering generality as the basis for evaluating the 
competence of any lawyer’s performance in a specific case is obvi-
ously unwise. My opinion in Padilla referenced a helpful amicus 
brief filed by the Asian American Justice Center to illustrate this 
point with real-world cases.10 For example, Maria Taganeca moved 
to the United States from Fiji when she was seven years old. Maria 
was enrolled in a community college and was taking care of her sick 
relatives when she was arrested while driving with some friends, one 
of whom had drugs in his possession. Although Maria did not have 
drugs on her person, she was charged under state law with posses-
sion of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Her attorney 
advised her to plead guilty, without accurately informing her that 
accepting such a plea would render her deportable. Thankfully, Ma-
ria was eventually spared deportation after lengthy legal proceed-
ings, but her case epitomizes the importance of legal advice about 
immigration consequences when a defendant is considering whether 
to plead guilty. 
Or, for a different view, consider the issue from the perspective 
of a defense attorney. As Chin and Holmes point out, it is inconceiv-
able that an attorney would make the following statement: 
I represent someone charged with DUI, and due to 
my excellent advocacy the prosecutor accepted a 
guilty plea with a one-day sentence instead of the 
three days imposed in almost every similar case. As 
an interesting aside, my client and his family were 
then deported based on the conviction; I have no idea 
whether I could have negotiated a deal resulting in 
conviction of a non-deportable offense; status as an 
                                                                                                             
 9 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
 10 See id. at 397, n. 7. 
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alien does not affect the fine or length of incarcera-
tion, so I never considered it. The results of this case 
demonstrate my remarkable legal abilities.11 
As the hypothetical demonstrates, a competent attorney consid-
ers the real-world consequences of a defendant’s guilty plea and 
should inform her client about the virtual certainty of deportation 
following a guilty plea. 
Fourth, as explained in Part I of the Court’s opinion in Padilla, 
as well as Part I of the Court’s earlier opinion in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,12 
it is Congress, rather than the Judiciary, that is responsible for the 
radical changes in our immigration law that have made deportation 
a virtual certainty in many offenses.13 For most of the twentieth cen-
tury, immigration law contained only a narrow category of deporta-
tion offenses and gave judges broad discretionary authority to pre-
vent deportation. The rules in this area of the law suffer from the 
same rigidity as the mandatory-minimum sentences that permeate 
the federal criminal code. While the courts can require counsel to 
provide adequate assistance to non-citizens facing potential depor-
tation, only Congress can change the rules that create potential un-
fairness for literally thousands upon thousands of productive, but 
non-voting, residents. If Congress were to re-introduce discretion 
over removability decisions for judges or the Attorney General, the 
importance of counsel’s advice about that possibility would no 
longer be as essential as it is today. 
To be sure, there is some force to the argument that applying 
Padilla retroactively would potentially open the proverbial litigation 
floodgates. But, however large that flood may be, it is the result of 
Congress’s unwise decision to eliminate discretion in removability 
proceedings. And, of course, only in meritorious cases will the non-
citizens obtain relief. The fair administration of justice is never cost-
free. 
Ultimately, I agree with the sentiment aptly expressed by Justice 
Sotomayor in her Chaidez dissent: “In Padilla, we did nothing more 
                                                                                                             
 11 Gabriel Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718 (2002). 
 12 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 13 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294–98. 
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than apply Strickland.”14 Rather than announcing a new rule of con-
stitutional law, we simply applied a familiar rule to the new set of 
facts that were the product of changes enacted by Congress. If, in-
stead of mandatory deportation, Congress were to impose a novel 
form of punishment—perhaps something akin to the Philippine “ca-
dena” described a century ago in the Weems15 case—I feel confident 
that the Court would not characterize a decision requiring counsel 
to advise her clients about the risk of that novel punishment as a 
“new rule of constitutional law.” Advice about the novel punishment 
of mandatory deportation is equally important. 
Thank you for your attention. 
                                                                                                             
 14 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1120 (2013). 
 15 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358 (1910). 
